Interactive-proof-based approaches are widely used in verifiable computation outsourcing. The verifier models a computationally constrained client and the provers model powerful service providers. In classical interactive-proof models with multiple provers, the provers' interests either perfectly align (as in MIP) or directly conflict (as in refereed games). However, service providers participating in outsourcing applications may not meet such extremes. Instead, each provider may be paid for his service, while he acts solely in his own best interest. An active research area in this context is rational interactive proofs (RIP), in which the provers try to maximize their payment. However, existing works consider either a single prover, or multiple provers who cooperate to maximize their total payment. None of them truly capture the strategic nature of multiple service providers. How to define and design non-cooperative rational interactive proofs is a well-known open problem.
Introduction
In the Internet era, many computation tasks are no longer carried out by the party that actually needs them. Instead, computationally constrained clients outsource computationally intensive problems to one or more third-party service providers who carry out the tasks, often in exchange for money [1, 2, 18, 19, 24, 25] . Two problems have received a great deal of attention from both theoreticians and practitioners in this area: how to guarantee correctness of the outsourced computation (without the client redoing the computation), and how to design the payment scheme. In many real-world computation-outsourcing applications, the two problems are closely related. In this work, we embed game-theoretic concepts into interactive proofs to tackle these problems.
Classic interactive proofs (IP) [5, 40] and multi-prover interactive proofs (MIP) [9] have been extremely well studied since their introduction three decades ago [6, 7, 9, 31, 35, 36, 39, 42, 53, 61, 62] . They have fueled active research in the area of verifiable computation outsourcing and delegation, both in the theory community [10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 26-28, 41, 45, 49, 50, 57] and, more recently, in the design of "nearly-practical" systems [11, 15, 55, 58-60, 63, 64, 66, 68] .
The classical models focus on the completeness and the soundness of the protocols, and are not concerned with payments. As payments naturally exist in computation-outsourcing marketplaces, rational interactive proofs (RIP) [3] and multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP) [23] instead provide a mechanism for the client to use payments strategically, allowing the client to have highly efficient outsourcing protocols, and thus to outsource harder computation problems. Many interesting rational proofs have already been designed [4, 14, 43, 44, 48, 69] .
In rational proofs, the client (though still called the verifier following literature's convention) does not "verify" the computation against arbitrary malicious provers in the classic sense. Rather, the correctness of the protocol is guaranteed by the rationality of the provers in the economic sense. The provers' objective is no longer to get the verifier to accept, but to maximize their expected payment. They may deviate from the protocol, but only in ways that increase the payment. In rational proofs, the verifier learns the correct answer whenever the expected payment is maximized.
Existing rational proofs, however, do not fully reflect the game-theoretic nature of a marketplace. They either have a single prover, or multiple cooperative provers whose incentives are perfectly aligned with each other and who collaborate to maximize the total expected payment. Although the notion of rationality is there, such provers are not too different from classic ones, who collaborate to maximize the acceptance probability of the verifier.
To explore the space of conflict and cooperation between rational provers, in this work we initiate the study of rational proofs with non-cooperative provers (ncRIP). The term "non-cooperative" does not mean that the provers are completely with conflict with each other as in zero-sum refereed games [21, 30, 32, 34] . Rather, as in non-cooperative game theory, it means each prover acts individually and selfishly to maximize his own expected payment.
We introduce our results and techniques next. We discuss the related work in detail in Section 5.
Results and Contributions
The main challenges in studying non-cooperative rational proofs are two-fold: (a) finding a meaningful equilibrium concept for the specific game structure of interactive proofs; and (b) designing interactive proofs where the verifier learns the correct answer under such an equilibrium. In this work, we address both of these challenges.
A New Solution Concept: Strong Sequential Equilibrium. The structure of interactive proofs is very different from games that are typically studied in game-theory literature (e.g., auctions), so existing solution concepts are not powerful enough to analyze such protocols.
As a warm-up, consider a first attempt: using Nash equilibrium in ncRIP protocols. We can easily turn the MRIP protocols in [22, 23] into non-cooperative protocols where the verifier learns the correct answer at some equilibrium. However, the protocol has many other equilibria where the answer is wrong; thus, equilibrium selection is a serious problem.
A natural way to handle equilibrium selection is to require maximum Nash equilibrium, which simultaneously maximizes all provers' payments. However, this is not enough for interactive proofs. Because the provers act in multiple rounds, interactive proofs are extensive-form games. They may have many unnatural Nash equilibria and are susceptible to empty threats. This is not surprising, since Nash equilibrium is well known to be unsuitable for extensive-form games.
A second attempt is to use subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which requires a Nash equilibrium at every subgame in the protocol to rule out empty threats. This does not work for interactive proofs because the provers do not see the messages exchanged between the verifier and the other provers, resulting in a game with imperfect information. In such games, there are often too few or even no proper subgames, so the SPE essentially degenerates to Nash equilibrium.
Finally, sequential equilibrium (SE) does not rely on subgames and can be used to analyze extensive-form games with imperfect information. However, SE has been widely criticized for imposing artificial requirements on the players, in order to explain their equilibrium strategies. To quote Kreps, one of the inventors of SE, "rather a lot of bodies are buried in this definition" [52, 54] .
To design and analyze ncRIP protocols, we first define a new solution concept for extensiveform games with imperfect information, strong sequential equilibrium (SSE), the main conceptual contribution of this work. SSE is a refinement of SE, and was designed to avoid its artificial conditions. We believe that SSE is of independent interest as a strong solution concept, and can be used to design general mechanisms based on extensive-form games. 1 In Appendix B, we prove important properties of SSE that are used in this work and may prove useful in future studies.
To resolve the problem of equilibrium selection, we define a maximum variant of SSE and apply it recursively to a larger class of "subgames". Informally, in a rational proof with non-cooperative provers, whenever the strategy profile used by the provers is a recursive-maximum SSE, it leads the verifier to the correct answer. The ncRIP framework is formally defined in Section 2.
Non-Cooperative Rational Proofs with Utility Gaps. Another important conceptual contribution of this paper is the notion of utility gap for ncRIP protocols. Utility gap is a fundamental concept for rational proofs [4, 23, 43] , and is analogous to soundness gap in classic interactive proofs. In particular, it measures how robust a protocol is against the provers' possible deviations from their desired strategies. This concept is easy to define for cooperative rational protocols, where a utility gap of u means that the total expected payment decreases by 1/u whenever the provers mislead the verifier to the wrong answer.
In non-cooperative protocols, however, it is not a priori clear how to define such a payment loss or who should suffer the loss. Since the provers are non-cooperative, a payment loss solely imposed on the total payment may not prevent some provers from deviating, and a loss solely imposed on the provers' final payments may not prevent them from deviating in subgames. The notion of utility gap must reflect these considerations, and compare strategy profiles in a way that captures how the provers reason in the extensive-form game induced by the protocol.
In this work, we provide a meaningful notion of utility gap for ncRIP, one that is naturally incorporated into the framework of recursive-maximum SSEs. Using this notion, we fully characterize the class of ncRIP protocols with different utility gaps.
Tight Characterizations of ncRIP Classes. With a solution concept as demanding as SSE, 1 See [29, 38, 65] for examples of mechanism design problems where extensive-form games have been designed. a risk is that one cannot design non-trivial rational proof protocols that satisfy its requirements. As part of our technical contributions, we construct ncRIP protocols with constant, polynomial, and exponential utility gaps for several powerful complexity classes, demonstrating the strength of our solution concept. Our protocols are simple and intuitive, thus easy to explain and implement. However, proving their correctness requires significant effort to analyze the provers' incentives and show that the protocol indeed meets the solution-concept and utility-gap requirements.
Given our ncRIP protocols, another natural question to ask is whether we are "overfitting" the solution concept so as to give the verifier unrealistic or unlimited power in leveraging the provers' rationality. As our main technical contribution, we prove tight upper-bounds for all three ncRIP classes. Such exact characterizations confirm that our solution concept properly reflects the gametheoretic nature of rational provers in interactive proofs. The techniques we use for the upper bounds are quite different from those used for the lower bounds, and require a deep understanding of the solution concept and extensive-form games.
Our results are stated in Figure 1 , where we use O(1)-ncRIP, poly(n)-ncRIP and exp(n)-ncRIP to denote ncRIP classes with constant, polynomial and exponential utility gaps respectively. The notations are analogous for MRIP. We characterize ncRIP classes via oracle Turing machines. In particular, P NEXP[O (1) ] is the class of languages decided by a polynomial-time Turing machine that makes O(1) queries to an NEXP oracle, and EXP poly-NEXP is the class decided by an exponential-time Turing machine with polynomial-length queries to an NEXP oracle. Non-Cooperative vs. Cooperative Provers. Interestingly, the power of rational proofs using non-cooperative proofs coincides with those using cooperative provers when we are concerned with constant or exponential utility gaps (see [22, 23] for characterizations of MRIP). Such coincidences can be explained by the power of adaptive versus non-adaptive queries in oracle Turing machines.
Indeed, our results reveal the main difference between non-cooperative and cooperative provers: the former can be used to handle adaptive oracle queries, the latter cannot-unless the adaptive queries can be converted to non-adaptive ones, which is the case for P NEXP[O(1)] and EXP poly-NEXP .
Intuitively, this makes sense-cooperative provers may collude across adaptive queries, answering some of them incorrectly in order to change future queries, and obtain a better payment overall. In contrast, non-cooperative provers allow us to dissociate the provers handling an oracle query from the others, ensuring overall correctness.
Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs
In this section we introduce the model for ncRIP.
Let L be a language and x be a string whose membership in L is to be decided, where n = |x|. An interactive protocol is a pair (V, P ), where V is the verifier, P = (P 1 , . . . , P p(n) ) is the vector of provers and p(n) a polynomial in n-that is, we allow polynomially many provers. The verifier runs in polynomial time and flips private coins. Each P i is computationally unbounded. The verifier and provers are given the input x. The verifier can communicate with each prover privately, but no two provers can communicate with each other.
In a round, either each prover sends a message to V , or V sends a message to each prover, and these two cases alternate. The length of each message ℓ(n), and the number of rounds k(n) are both polynomial in n. Let r be the random string used by V . Let m be the final transcript of the protocol ( m is a random variable depending on r). At the end of the communication, based on x, r, and m, the verifier computes an answer bit c ∈ {0, 1} for the membership of x in L, and a payment vector R = (R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R t(n) ), where R i is the payment given to P i and R i ∈ [−1, 1], and the total
The protocol and the payment function R are public knowledge. Each prover P i 's strategy at round j maps the transcript seen at the beginning of round j to the message he sends in that round. Let s i = (s i1 , . . . , s ik(n) ) be the strategy of prover P i , and s = (s 1 , . . . , s t(n) ) be the strategy profile of the provers. Given input x, and strategy profile s, let µ k (x, s, (V, P )) denote the expected payment of prover P k in the protocol (V, P ) based on randomness r, input x and s; if (V, P ) is clear from context, this is shortened to µ k (x, s).
At a high level, the provers choose their strategy individually to maximize their own payment; we formalize the solution concept in Section 2.1. The goal of the verifier is to incetivize them to give correct answers and the protocol must ensure that V learns the correct answer bit c.
As the protocol proceeds in rounds, and each prover only observes the messages that the verifier sends to him, the protocol defines an extensive-form game with imperfect information. We review the relevant concepts of extensive-form games in the context of ncRIP protocols in Section A.
Strong Sequential Equilibrium
We now introduce a new solution concept, which is a refinement of sequential equilibrium.
Sequential Equilibrium (SE). Sequential equilibrium considers a strategy profile s together with a belief system µ, where µ specifies, for each information set I, the probability assigned to each history in I. SE imposes a consistency condition on s and µ: s and µ are consistent if there exists a sequence (s t , µ t ) ∞ t=1 that converges to (s, µ), such that each s t is a profile of completely mixed behavioral strategies and each µ t is the belief system derived from s t using Bayes' rule.
The pair (s, µ) is a SE if s and µ are consistent and conditioned on any information set I i being reached by a player i, player i's strategy is a best response to the others' given i's beliefs at I i (specified by µ).
The downside of this equilibrium concept is that unreachable information sets (reached with probability 0 under the equilibrium strategy s) have a somewhat artificial consistency requirement that involves computing the limit of sequences.
Strong Sequential Equilibrium (SSE).
A strong sequential equilibrium is identical to SE for reachable information sets. However, SSE does not require a consistency condition to deal with beliefs at unreachable information sets. Instead, for any unreachable information set I, SSE requires that the acting player's strategy be a best response to the others, for any beliefs he may hold at I. Definition 6. (Strong Sequential Equilibrium) A strategy profile s is a strong sequential equilibrium if for every player i and information set I i of i:
• If I is reachable under s: conditioned on I i being reached, player i's strategy s i is a best response to s −i , given i's beliefs at I i being derived from s using Bayes' rule.
• If I is not reachable under s: conditioned on I i being reached, player i's strategy s i is a best response to s −i , given any beliefs of i at I i .
Strong sequential equilibrium strengthens SE so that a player's beliefs at unreachable information sets are irrelevant in justifying his equilibrium strategy. Unlike SE, not every extensive-form game with perfect recall has an SSE. However, in the context of mechanism design, SSE allows for the design of stronger mechanisms. 3 Although we introduce SSE to analyze ncRIP protocols, we believe it is of independent interest as a solution concept for mechanisms based on extensive-form games. In Section B, we give an equivalent definition of SSE and several useful structural results.
Solution Concept for ncRIP: Recursive-Maximum SSE
To deal with equilibrium selection, we define maximum SSE. A strategy profile s is a maximum SSE if it is an SSE and for any player i and SSE s ′ , u i (s) ≥ u i (s ′ ). However, maximum SSE alone is not enough to resolve equilibrium-selection problems in extensive-form games, as the maximality is only imposed at the root. Instead, we impose the maximality condition at every subgame.
As an extensive-form game with imperfect information may have very few subgames, we extend the notion of a subgame to ensure that the solution concept "has enough bite." Forest Subgames. A subgame is a subtree that can be singled out from the game tree and treated as a separate well-defined game. Singling out an information set that contains several nodes does not give a tree, but a forest. When can such a forest be treated as a separate game?
For any information set I, let H I be forest rooted at I, that is,
where H is the set of all valid histories in the game. For a history h ∈ H, let I(h) be the unique information set containing h. Let F I be the set of all information sets following I, that is,
As h can be the empty history φ, we have I ∈ F I . Definition 7. (Forest Subgame) For any information set I, H I is a forest subgame rooted at I if for every I ′ ∈ F I and everyĥ ∈ F I , ∃h ′ ∈ I and ∃h ∈ H I such thatĥ = (h ′ , h).
Roughly speaking, a forest subgame H I completely contains all the information sets following I, so there is no information asymmetry between the players acting within H I . Thus a standard subgame is automatically a forest subgame, and the entire game is a forest subgame at the root.
A forest subgame H I and a probability distribution µ I on I together form a well-define game, where the players' expected utilities under s are based on µ I and Nature moves in H I .
A forest subgame H I is reachable under s if I is reachable under s. Given a strategy profile s, let s I be the strategy profile induced by s in the forest subgame H I . The height of a forest subgame H I is the length of the longest path in the game following the information set I.
Recursive-Maximum SSE. To deal with equilibrium selection in ncRIP protocols, we introduce a solution concept that recursively induces a maximum SSE in every forest subgame of the game. We are ready to formalize the definition of rational proofs with non-cooperative provers.
Definition 9. For any language L, an interactive protocol (V, P ) is a non-cooperative rational interactive proof (ncRIP) protocol for L if, for any x ∈ {0, 1} * , there exists a strategy profile s of the provers that is a recursive-maximum SSE in the corresponding extensive-form game, and under any recursive-maximum SSE, the answer bit c output by the verifier is correct (i.e., c = 1 iff x ∈ L) with probability 1, where the probability is taken over the verifier's randomness.
Utility Gap in ncRIP Protocols
The notion of recursive-maximum SSE provides a strong guarantee that rational non-cooperative provers will act as prescribed by the protocol and lead the verifier to the correct answer. However, this is only true in the classic game-theoretic sense where the players are perfectly rational and "sensitive" to arbitrarily small utility losses. In this sense, the provers in our ncRIP protocols will not deviate to other strategies even if the deviations only cause a tiny payment loss.
In reality, some provers may not care about small payment losses. Such provers could still deviate from the prescribed strategies and lead the verifier to the wrong answer. To make ncRIP protocols robust against such "insensitive" provers, we define the notion of utility gap.
Roughly speaking, a utility gap of u means that if a strategy profile s is not a recursive-maximum SSE and leads the verifier to the wrong answer, then some provers must be losing at least a 1/u amount in their individual payments in some part of the game. As a consequence, these provers will not deviate to s, as long as they care about 1/u payment losses.
Intuitively, utility gap is analogous to soundness gap-the difference between completeness and soundness-in classic interactive proofs. Both concepts measure the robustness of the corresponding protocols. If a classic interactive proof protocol has a large soundness gap, then it will be difficult for malicious provers to make the verifier accept when x / ∈ L. If an ncRIP protocol has a large utility gap, then even provers who are not perfectly rational and are insensitive to small payment losses will not have incentives to deviate and lead the verifier to the wrong answer.
Definition 10. Let (V, P ) be an ncRIP protocol for a language L and s * be a recursive-maximum SSE in the resulting game. The protocol (V, P ) has an α(n)-utility gap or α(n)-gap, if for any strategy profile s ′ that is an SSE and the answer bit c ′ under s ′ is wrong, there exists a forest subgame H I reachable under s ′ , and a prover P j acting in H I who has deviated from s * such that
where s ′ −I denotes the strategy profile s ′ outside forest subgame H I , that is,
The class of languages that have an ncRIP protocol with constant, polynomial and exponential utility gap, are denoted by O(1)-ncRIP, poly(n)-ncRIP, and exp(n)-ncRIP respectively. 4 
Lower Bounds: ncRIP Protocols with Utility Gap
In this section, we give an O(1)-utility gap ncRIP protocol for the class NEXP and use it to give an O(α(n))-utility gap ncRIP protocol for the class P NEXP[α(n)] . Setting α(n) to be a constant or polynomial in n gives us P NEXP[O(1)] ⊆ O(1)-ncRIP and P NEXP ⊆ poly(n)-ncRIP respectively.
Then, we show how to simulate any cooperative multi-prover rational interactive proof (MRIP) using an ncRIP protocol with negligible utility gap. Since EXP ||NP ⊆ MRIP, and EXP ||NP = EXP poly−NEXP [23] , this proves that EXP poly−NEXP ⊆ exp(n)-ncRIP.
Here we argue correctness of our protocols at a high level; see Section C for full proofs.
Constant-gap ncRIP protocol for NEXP. The ncRIP protocol for any language in NEXP is in Figure 2 . While the protocol is simple and uses the classic 2-prover 1-round MIP for NEXP [31] as a blackbox, in the analysis we have to open up the black-box. In particular, if P 1 sends c = 0 in round 1, all the information sets of P 1 and P 2 in round 3 become unreachable. To show that a strong sequential equilibrium exists, we need to show that the provers have a best response at these unreachable sets, which is argued based on the messages exchanged in the classic MIP procotol. This protocol is a good example to highlight the differences between ncRIP and MRIP protocols-the ncRIP protocol appears almost identical to the MRIP protocol for NEXP [23] . However, the analyses are significantly different-the correctness of the MRIP protocol follows almost immediately from that of the blackbox MIP protocol, while in the case of ncRIP we have to prove that the protocol meets all the conditions of the demanding solution concept.
Lemma 11. Any language L ∈ NEXP has a 2-prover 3-round 6/5-gap ncRIP protocol.
For any input x and language L ∈ NEXP, the protocol (V, P 1 , P 2 ) for L is: 1. P 1 sends a bit c to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol. 2. If c = 0, then the protocol ends and the payments are R 1 = R 2 = 1/2. 3. Otherwise, V runs the classic 2-prover 1-round MIP protocol for NEXP with P 1 and P 2 to prove if x ∈ L. If the MIP protocol accepts then R 1 = 1, R 2 = 1; else, O(α(n))-gap ncRIP protocol for P NEXP[α(n)] . Next, we give an ncRIP protocol with O(α(n))-utility gap for the class P NEXP[α(n)] , where α(n) is a function of n which (1) only takes positive integral values, (2) is upper-bounded by a polynomial in n, and (3) is polynomial-time computable. 5 Lemma 12. Any language L ∈ P NEXP[α(n)] has a 2-prover 5-round 6/(5α(n))-gap ncRIP protocol.
The ncRIP protocol for any L ∈ P NEXP[α(n)] is in Figure 3 . It is fairly intuitive-V simulates the polynomial-time Turing machine directly, and uses the ncRIP protocol for NEXP for the queries.
The analysis of the protocol illustrates the robustness of the solution concept. In particular, the NEXP queries start the non-trivial forest subgames in the game, and which of them are reachable under any strategy profile s is determined solely by P ′ 1 strategy. To avoid suboptimal equilibria and the problem of empty threats, recursive-maximality must hold at both reachable and unreachable forest subgames. Otherwise, P 1 cannot unilaterally deviate out of a bad strategy where he is lying on an NEXP gate to a strategy giving the correct answers (and thus making a previously unreachable NEXP query reachable), if P 2 and P 3 are giving wrong answers at those NEXP queries. 5 For Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, α(n) need only be a constant or polynomial in n. However, Lemma 12 holds for all α(n)'s that are polynomial-time computable (given 1 n ) and polynomially bounded, such as, log n, √ n, etc.
The utility-gap analysis of the protocol in Figure 3 shows that even though V can only check the NEXP queries that P 1 wants V to see, the protocol is designed to ensure that deviating provers in some reachable forest subgame suffer an O(1/α(n)) loss in their overall expected payment.
For any input x of length n, the protocol (V, P ) works as follows. 1. P 1 sends (c, c 1 , . . . , c α(n) ) ∈ {0, 1} α(n)+1 to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol. 2. V simulates M on x using the bits c 1 , . . . , c α(n) as answers to NEXP queries φ 1 , . . . , φ α(n) generated by M respectively. If M accepts and c = 0 or M rejects and c = 1, then the protocol ends and R 1 = −1, R 2 = R 3 = 0. 3. V picks a random index i ′ from {1, . . . , α(n)} and sends (i ′ , φ i ′ ) to P 2 and P 3 . 4. V runs the 2-prover 3-round O(1)-gap ncRIP protocol for NEXP ( Figure 4 ) with P 2 and P 3 on φ i . P 2 and P 3 get payments R 2 and R 3 based on the protocol. Let c * i ′ be the answer bit in the NEXP protocol. If
Simulating any MRIP protocol using a ncRIP Protocol. We show how to simulate a general MRIP protocol (V, P ) with p(n) provers and k(n) rounds using a 2-prover 3-round ncRIP protocol Figure 4 in Section C.) Essentially, V ′ gives all the randomness of V to P ′ 1 and asks for the entire transcript and uses P ′ 2 to commit to a single prover's message, and cross-checks their answers. However, we don't want P ′ 1 who has access to the all the randomness to dictate what information sets of P ′ 2 are reachable. Because the ncRIP protocol need only have an exponentially small utility gap, V ′ asks one prover a totally random question (independent of P ′ 1 ), and with exponentially small probability this random message is exactly the message V ′ intended to check. This protocol shows why negligible gap guarantees do not lead to meaningful protocols-a verifier that asks random questions can still extract honest behavior from rational provers through the negligible changes in expected payments.
Upper Bounds: ncRIP Protocols with Utility Gap
In this section, we prove matching upper bounds on the classes of ncRIP protocols with constant, polynomial and negligible utility gaps. We focus on the upper bound for O(1)-ncRIP and poly(n)-ncRIP, in which a polynomial-time Turing machine needs to simulate the protocol with a constant and polynomial number of queries to an NEXP oracle respectively.
To simulate an ncRIP protocol, we need to use an oracle Turing machine to find a strategy profile "close enough" to the recursive-maximum SSE so that the answer bit is still correct. In particular, we don't have to find a recursive-maximum SSE of the game, instead testing the utility gap guarantee is enough. We restate Definition 10 below, which reflects this intuition.
Observation 13. Given input x and an α(n)-utility gap ncRIP protocol (V, P ), let s be an SSE such that that for all forest subgames H I (reachable under s), and for all provers P j acting in H I :
where s * is a recursive-maximum SSE. Then, the answer bit c under s must be correct.
There are several challenges involved in finding a strategy profile satisfying Observation 13. First, the size of the game tree of any ncRIP protocol-small gap notwithstanding-can be exponential in n. Even if the polynomial-time Turing machine considers a single strategy profile s at a time, since V can flip polynomially many coins, the part of the tree "in play"-the number of decision nodes reached with nonzero probability under s-can still be exponential in n.
The second and related problem is that while the NEXP oracle can guess and verify an SSE, it cannot help the Turing machine directly with maximum SSEs. In particular, the polynomial-time machine must go bottom-up in the game tree and find an SSE that is recursively maximal on all its reachable subgames (which can again be exponential in n).
Finally, the polynomial-time machine needs to search through the exponentially large strategyprofile space in an efficient way to find one which leads to the correct answer.
We now prove a fundamental lemma about ncRIP protocols with utility gap that lets us get around the first two challenges mentioned above.
Pruning Nature moves in ncRIP protocols. A verifier's coin flips in an ncRIP protocol represent Nature moves in the resulting game. A Nature move that imposes nonzero probabilities over exponentially many outcomes can cause the game tree under play to be exponential in size.
We prune the Nature moves of a verifier so that a polynomial-time Turing machine simulating an α(n) utility gap protocol can traverse the game tree reachable under any given s. Lemma 14. Let L ∈ α(n)-ncRIP and let (V, P ) be an ncRIP protocol for L with α(n) utility gap and p(n) provers. Given an input x and a strategy s, the protocol (V, P ) can be transformed in exponential time to a new protocol, say (V ′ , P ), where • the probability distributions imposed by the nature moves of
. , p(n)}, and
• if the answer bit under s is wrong, then there exists a forest subgame H I in the game (V ′ , P ) (reachable under s) and a prover P j acting at H I , such that P j loses a 1/(2α(n)) amount in his expected payment compared to a strategy profile where s I (induced by s on H I ) is replaced by s *
I
(the recursive-maximum SSE on H I ), keeping the strategy profile outside H I , s −I , fixed.
We prove Lemma 14 in several parts. First, we show how to transform any nature move of V that imposes a non-zero probability distribution on exponentially many outcomes into a probability distribution with O(α(n)) support, given an input x and a strategy s of the provers.
Let (V, P ) use p(n) provers and let the running time of V be n k for some constant k. There can be at most 2 n k different payments that V can generate for a particular prover given the input x. Given x and s, fix a prover index j ∈ {1, p(n)}. Let R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m be the payments generated by V on s for P j . Let V 's randomness assign probability distribution µ = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ) to R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m respectively. Then, the expected payment of
For each prover P j , divide the interval [−1, 1] into 4α(n) intervals, each of length 1/(2α(n)). In other words, prover P j 's ith interval is [i/2α(n), (i + 1)/2α(n)), for each i ∈ {−2α(n), . . . , 2α(n) − 1}. 6 We round the possible payments for P j to a representative of the interval they belong. Specifically, we map each payment R i to r j as described in Equation 1. There are potentially exponentially many different payments R i , and only polynomially many different payments r j , so several R i must map to the same r j . Let T j = {i : R i maps to r j }. Let T = ∪ j {T j }. Thus the total number of distinct r j 's is 8α(n),
For each T j ∈ T , let f (T j ) denote a unique index in the set T j . Without loss of generality, let f (T j ) be the lowest index in T j . We define a new probability distribution
the payments R 1 , . . . , R h respectively given by Equating 2. In particular, for every T j ∈ T , assign R f (T j ) probability k∈T j p k and for every other index ℓ ∈ T j , ℓ = f (T j ), assign R ℓ probability 0. Define V ′ as a polynomial-time verifier that simulates all deterministic computation of V and for a fixed input x, it imposes a probability distribution µ ′ with O(α(n)) support for any probability distribution µ imposed by V . For other inputs, V ′ simulates V without any modification.
Note that given input x, a strategy profile s and the protocol (V, P ), transforming the distribution µ to µ ′ takes time linear in the size of the game tree, and thus exponential in n. (This means that an NEXP oracle, given x, can guess a particular s and perform the transformation.)
Next, we show that if the strategy profile s is a recursive-maximum SSE of (V, P ), then s restricted to the pruned game tree of (V ′ , P ) imposes a recursive-maximum SSE on (V ′ , P ) as well.
Claim 15. Any recursive-maximum SSE s in the game tree of protocol (V, P ) induces a recursivemaximum SSE in the game tree of protocol (V ′ , P ).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose s is not an SSE of (V ′ , P ). Then there exists an information set I = {h 1 , . . . , h m }, such that, conditioned on reaching I, the prover acting at I can improve his expected payment by deviating (given his belief u ′ I at I if I is reachable under s and for any belief he may hold at I if I is unreachable under s).
We split into two cases: I is either reachable or unreachable under s. By construction, if I is reachable under s in (V ′ , P ), then I must also be reachable under s in (V, P ). Let
, where p ′ i is the probability assigned to h i and the support of µ ′ I is O(α(n)). Let R 1 , . . . , R m be the payments that the player acting on I gets under s conditioned on reaching h 1 , . . . , h m respectively. Similarly, let R ′ 1 , . . . , R ′ m be the payments conditioned on reaching h 1 , . . . , h m respectively under the strategy to which the player at I deviates from s. Then,
. . , p m ) be the beliefs on I under s in (V, P ). We use the relationship between the distributions µ ′ I and µ I , to show that such a deviation in (V ′ , P ) would imply a deviation in (V, P ). In particular, mapping µ ′ I back to µ I , using Equation 2 we get:
Inequality 3 holds because R ′ f (S(i)) > R f (S(i)) , and so the two payments lie in different intervals in the mapping (Equation 1). Thus the minimum payment in the interval of R ′ f (S(i)) will be greater that the maximum payment in the interval of R f (S(i)) . Finally, Inequality 4 contradicts the fact that s was an SSE in (V, P ), achieving a contradiction for the case of information reachable sets. For unreachable information sets the argument is easy. If I is unreachable under s in (V ′ , P ), then I must be unreachable under s in (V, P ). If the action of prover acting at I is not his best response in (V ′ , P ) for some history h ∈ I then, it contradicts the fact that s is an SSE of (V, P ). Now, suppose s is not a recursive-maximum SSE of (V ′ , P ). Then there exists a subgame H I of height k such that s is recursive-maximum on all subgames following H I of height < k but not maximum at H I (among SSE's that are recursively-maximum at all forest subgames following H I ). Let s * be recursive-maximum on H I , then the expected payment of at least one prover P j is better under s * , while everyone else does just as well (given the beliefs at I derived using Bayes' rule if I is reachable under s or given any beliefs if I is unreachable under s). Writing out the expression of expected payment of P j conditioned on reaching H I and "unfolding" the probability distribution back to the original game, we get a contradiction that s could not have been a recursive-maximum SSE of the original game, as the same strategy s * would give P j a better expected payment at H I while doing just as well for other provers. The proof is similar as before and we omit the details.
We now show that for a given s, the expected payments of the provers under (V, P ) and under (V ′ , P ) are not too far off. In particular, we prove the following claim.
Proof. Given input x and strategy profile s, fix a prover P j . Let V generate payments R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m under s for P j , and assign the probability distribution µ = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ) on R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R m respectively. Using Equations (1) and (2) we compare P j 's expected payment:
To complete the proof of Lemma 14, we show that (V ′ , P ) preservers utility gap guarantees.
Claim 17. Given input x, if the answer bit under s is wrong, then there exists a forest subgame H I reachable under s in (V ′ , P ) and P j acting at H I , such that P j 's expected payment under s is 1 2α(n) less than his expected payment under (s −I , s * I ), where s * I is a recursive-maximum SSE on H I .
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s * that is a recursive-maximum SSE in the game tree of (V, P ). Since s gives the wrong answer bit, from the α(n)-utility gap guarantee of (V, P ) and Definition 10, there exists a forest-subgame H I reachable under s, such that a prover P j acting in H I loses 1/α(n) in his expected payment under s compared to the strategy profile (s −I , s * I ). That is,
Using Claim 15, s * also induces a recursive-maximum SSE in the game tree of (V ′ , P ). And since H I is reachable under s in (V, P ), it is reachable under s in (V ′ , P ) as well. We show that:
Using Claim 16, prover P j 's expected payments in the two protocols under s and s * follow:
There are four cases depending on the sign of the left hand side of Inequalities (7) and (8) . We show that Claim 17 holds for one of the cases and omit the details of the others, which are similar.
Suppose the left hand side of both inequalities is positive, that is,
Searching through strategy-profile space efficiently. Using Lemma 14, given an input x and an α(n)-utility gap ncRIP protocol (V, P ), when α(n) is constant or polynomial, a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine can use its NEXP oracle to guess a certain strategy profile s, prune the Nature moves of V , and report the resulting O(α(n))-support distribution bit-by-bit. Thus, it is able to simulate the new distribution to figure out which decision nodes are reachable under s.
The next question then is, how should the polynomial-time Turing machine navigate the potential strategy-profile space in polynomial-time to find the strategy profile that satisfies Observation 13 (and thus gives the correct answer bit)? To do this, we invoke a recurring idea: divide each prover's expected payment interval [−1, 1], evenly into 8α(n) subintervals of length 1/(4α(n)), and consider subinterval profiles (tuple of subintervals, one for each prover) to cut down on the search space.
Claim 18. Given an input x and a ncRIP protocol (V, P ) with α(n)-utility gap, consider a subinterval profile (L 1 , . . . , L p(n) ), where each L i = [k/(4α), (k + 1)/(4α + 1)) denotes a subinterval of prover P i in [−1, 1], for some k ∈ {−2α(n), . . . , 2α(n) − 1}. If any SSE s that has an expected payment profileũ(x, s) such that u i (x, s) ∈ L i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p(n), and s does not satisfy Obversation 13, then the expected payment profileũ * (x, s) under a recursive-maximum SSE s * cannot lie in the same subinterval profile, that is, there exists a prover index j such that
Proof. Since s does not satisfy Observation 13, there exists a reachable forest subgame H I and prover P j acting on H I such that the following holds. Without loss of generality, let
Using Claim 18, if the polynomial-time Turing machine is able to test any SSE s withũ(x, s) in a subinterval profile, for all subinterval profiles, it is guaranteed to find one that satisfies Obsveration 13. This is because a recursive-maximum SSE of an ncRIP protocol is guaranteed to exist and its expected payment profile must belong to some subinterval profile.
However, as there are O(α(n) subintervals for each of the p(n) provers, there are O(α(n) p(n) ) total subinterval profiles and a polynomial-time machine cannot test SSEs for each of them. To reduce the search space further, we show that it is sufficient to consider subintervals of the total expected-payment interval and test an SSE s for each of them. To test if an SSE s satisfies Observation 13, we go bottom-up in the game tree reachable under s to find the maximum SSE for all forest subgames (always exists in an ncRIP protocol).
Recall that a maximum SSE is an SSE where for any player i and SSE s ′ , u i (s) ≥ u i (s ′ ). We can find such an SSE by querying about total expected-payment intervals only using the next lemma.
Lemma 19. If a maximum SSE exists then a strategy profile s is a maximum SSE if and only if s is an SSE, and, s maximizes the sum of utilities of all players among all SSEs.
Using Lemma 19, we can divide the total expected payment range [−1, 1] into α(n)/4-sized subintervals, and query whether a strategy profile has a total expected payment in a given interval. 7 We are now ready to prove the upper bounds on the power of our ncRIP classes.
Constant Utility Gap. Using Lemma 14 and Lemma 19, simulating a constant-gap protocol using a P NEXP[O(1)] machine M is easy. In particular, there are at most O(1) forest subgames that are reachable under any strategy profile s, and the total expected payment of the provers conditioned on reaching these forest subgames will be in one of the O(1) subintervals. Thus, there are O(1) combinations of total expected payments on all forest subgames (including the whole game). M queries its NEXP oracle whether their exists an SSE that achieves that combination of total expected payments on those forest subgames, for all combinations. Then, M finds the maximum among all of the combinations that got a "yes". Such a maximum is guaranteed to exist for an ncRIP protocol and finally M queries the oracle for the answer bit of the corresponding SSE by giving the maximum profile of total expected payments over the subgames. Polynomial Utility Gap. To simulate a polynomial-utility gap ncRIP protocol (V, P ), using a P NEXP machine M , we put to use all the structure we have established in this section. We note that the simple strategy of querying all possible payment combinations as in Lemma 20 does not work (there are total O(α(n) α(n) ) combinations). We present a high-level structure of the proof here; see Section C for full proof. For each of the O(α(n)) subintervals of the interval [−1, 1] that correspond to an SSE, M does a recursive search to find an exact total expected payment u(x, s) that is generated by an SSE. In particular, M queries the NEXP oracle: Does there exist an SSE with total expected payment in the first half of the ith interval, then recurses on the first half if the answer is yes, else recurses on the second half. Thus, in polynomial time and queries, M can find an exact u(x, s) for an SSE s in the subinterval using the power of its adaptive queries.
Next, M simulates the protocol (V, P ) with the help of the oracle, under the SSE s for a given subinterval. The Lemma 14 is crucial for M to simulate the verifier's moves, because V in general can induce exponential-size distributions. M traverses the tree reachable under s "top-down" using the oracle to learn the pruned distributions and provers' moves. Finally, M goes "bottom-up" to test whether s satisfies Observation 13 on all its reachable subgames. Negligible Utility Gap. Finally, we prove a tight upper bound on the class of ncRIP protocols with negligible utility gaps. The proof follows immediately from that of Lemma 22. In fact, it is simpler as the exponential-time Turing machine is powerful enough to (a) simulate V 's Nature moves directly, and (b) test all possible payment profiles. Thus in this proof we don't need Lemma 14 or the notion of subintervals.
Lemma 23. ncRIP ⊆ EXP poly−NEXP .
Remark 24. Since EXP poly−NEXP ⊆ EXP ||poly−NEXP = EXP ||NP , and EXP ||NP ⊆ MRIP [23] , Lemma 23 shows that exp(n)-ncRIP ⊆ exp(n)-MRIP and using Lemma 31, we get that in general the two classes coincide. In other words, non-cooperative rational proofs are as powerful as cooperative multi-prover rational proofs under negligible utility gap and we get Corollary 5.
Additional Related Work
Classical Interactive Proofs. Classical interactive proofs [5, 40] and multi-prover interactive proofs [9] have been extensively studied (see, e.g., [6, 7, 9, 35, 36, 39, 42] ) and precisely characterized, that is, IP = PSPACE [53, 61] and MIP = NEXP [6, 31, 35] .
Recently, interactive proofs have also been studied in the context of computation delegation [41, 45, 49, 57] , and in the streaming setting [20, [26] [27] [28] .
Rational Proofs. Azar and Micali [3] introduced rational interactive proofs (RIP) and used scoring rules to construct simple and efficient (single-prover) RIP protocols. In a follow-up work [4] , the authors design super-efficient rational proofs that have sublinear verification and computation compelexity. Guo et al. present rational arguments for a computationally bounded prover and a sublinear verifier in [43] , and construct rational arguments for all languages in P [44] . More recently, Campanelli and Rosario [14] study sequentially composable rational proofs and Zhang and Blanton [69] design protocols to outsource matrix multiplications to a rational cloud.
Game-Theoretic Characterization of Complexity Classes. Game-theoretic characterization of complexity classes has been largely studied in the form of refereed games [21, 30, 32-34, 51, 56] . Chandra and Stockmeyer [21] show that any language in PSPACE is refereeable by a game of perfect information. Feige and Kilian [30] show this is tight for single-round refereed games and that the class of languages with polynomial-round refereed games is exactly EXP. Feigenbaum, Koller and Shor [34] study a related complexity class EXP NP and show that it can be simulated as a zero-sum refereed game between two computationally unbounded provers with imperfect recall.
Query Complexity and Related Complexity Classes. The query complexity of oracle Turing machines has been widely studied in the literature [8, 13, 67] . In this paper, we give game-theoretic characterizations of the classes P NEXP[O(1)] . P NEXP , and EXP poly−NEXP .
A Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information and ncRIP
We describe a rational proof protocol with non-cooperative provers as an extensive-form game, where the game tree is naturally induced by the possible coin flips and messages of the verifiers, as well as the possible messages of the provers. For details on extensive-form games, we refer the readers to the textbook by Osborne and Rubinstein [54] .
In a protocol (V, P ) with input x, the set of provers P = (P 1 , . . . , P t(n) ) are the players and the verifier V 's random coin flips are treated as the moves of Nature. The history h = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a K ) corresponding to a decision node is the sequence of actions taken by Nature and the players along the path from the root to the decision node. The set of valid histories (including φ, the empty history corresponding to the root) is denoted by H. A history h is terminal if it corresponds to a leaf in the game tree, and non-terminal otherwise. Let Z(h) denote the player whose turn it is to act following a non-terminal history h-note that even though in an ncRIP protocol more than one prover may send a message to the verifier in a round, without loss of generality we can increase the number of rounds such that only a single prover acts in each round. Let A(h) denote the set of actions available to the acting player at a non-terminal history h: that is, A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}. If Z(h) is Nature, then A(h) is the set of possible coin flips and messages of the verifier following h; otherwise A(h) is the set of possible messages that Z(h) may send to the verifier. For each terminal history h, the utility of a player i following h, u i (h), is the payment R i computed by the verifier given x and h.
Since the verifier's coins are private and a prover does not see the messages exchanged between the verifier and the other provers, an ncRIP protocol represents an extensive-form game of imperfect information. An information set I i of a player P i is a subset of all possible histories h with Z(h) = P i , and represents all the information that the player knows when acting in one of the decision nodes in I i . That is, when a decision node in I i is reached, P i knows that I i has been reached but does not know exactly which node he is at. Naturally, A(h) = A(h ′ ) for all h, h ′ ∈ I i -that is, the set of actions available to player i at every decision node in a particular information set is the same. Let A(I i ) denote the set of available actions at an information set I i . The set of all information sets of P i forms a partition of the set {h ∈ H : Z(h) = P i }, and let I i to denote this partition, referred to as the information partition of P i . In terms of the protocol, I i is in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of possible message sequences (m i1 , . . . , m ij ) seen by P i , where j ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)} and P i is acting in round j.
A pure strategy s i of a player P i in an extensive-form game is a function that assigns an action in A(I i ) to each information set I i ∈ I i . A behavioral strategy β i of P i is a collection (β i (I i )) I i ∈I i of independent probability measures, where β i (I i ) is a probability measure over the action set A(I i ). A behavioral strategy β i is completely mixed if each β i (I i ) assigns a positive probability to every action in A(I i ). In ncRIP protocols, since the provers are deterministic, we only consider pure strategies of the players. However, the solution concept introduced in this paper applies to behavioral strategies as well. A player i's utility under a strategy profile s, u i (s), is his expected utility over the distribution of histories induced by s and the verifier's randomness.
The provers are computationally unbounded and never "forget" anything and thus the corresponding extensive-form game has perfect recall. That is, for any two histories h and h ′ in the same information set I i of a player P i , h and h ′ pass the same sequence of information sets to player P i . Furthermore, for any information set in this sequence, player P i took the same action in h and h ′ . This holds in any ncRIP protocol since all histories of prover P i in the same information set I i at round j correspond to the sequence of messages (m i1 , . . . , m ij ) seen by P i up to round j.
B Properties of Strong Sequential Equilibrium
In this section, we prove several important properties of strong sequential equilibrium, which make it a good candidate solution concept in designing extensive-form mechanisms.
Strong Sequential Equilibrium Admits a Sequential Equilibrium. We first show that, given a strategy profile s that is a strong sequential equilibrium (thus does not rely on a belief system), we can construct a belief system µ such that the pair (s, µ) forms a sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 25. For any strategy profile s that is a strong sequential equilibrium, there exists a belief system µ such that (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. The sequential-rationality requirement will follow easily from the definition of SSE. To prove that s admits a sequential equilibrium, the key is to pair it with a consistent belief system; see Section 2 for definition. Indeed, we construct a belief system µ and show that, there exists a sequence of pairs (s ε , µ ε ) ε→0 which converges to (s, µ), as ε goes to 0, where each s ε is a profile of completely mixed behavioral strategies and each u ε is the belief system derived from s ε using Bayes' rule.
Recall that a strategy profile s defines a probability distribution over the actions available to a player at an information set where he acts. That is, for each information set I i of a player i, s i (I i ) is a probability distribution over A(I i ), the set of actions available to player i at I i . In particular, if A(
where p i (a ℓ ) is the probability that player i chooses action a ℓ at I i . Let A + (I i ) and A 0 (I i ) be the set of actions at information set I i which player i chooses with positive probability and zero probability respectively; that is,
For any ε ∈ (0, 1), we define s ε i for player i at information set I i as follows:
By construction, s ε i (I i ) is a valid probability distribution over I i and is completely mixed, that is, assigns a positive probability to every action in I i . Indeed, because
It is easy to see that s ε i converges to s i when ε → 0. Given the strategy profile s ε , to define µ ε i , the belief system of a player i, consider an arbitrary information set I i where player i acts. The probability that a particular history h = (a 1 , . . . , a K ) ∈ I i occurs can be derived from s ε as follows. For any history h ′ = (a 1 , . . . , a w ) with 0 ≤ w ≤ K − 1, recall that Z(h ′ ) is the player acting following history h ′ . For any action a ∈ A(h ′ ), let s ε Z(h ′ ) (h ′ )(a) denote the probability assigned by s ε Z(h ′ ) to action a at history h ′ (i.e., at the information set containing h ′ ). We have
where c h , e h and f h are positive constants depending on s and h, but not on ε. In particular, letting S 0 be the set of actions a w+1 in h that are assigned zero probability by s Z(h ′ ) at history h ′ = (a 1 , . . . , a w ), we have e h = |S 0 |. f h is the number of actions a w+1 in h such that a w+1 is not in S 0 but s Z(h ′ ) is not completely mixed at h ′ either. Finally,
where the second term is defined to be 1 if S 0 = ∅. Note that Pr {h occurs under s ε } > 0 for every h ∈ I i . The probability that the information set I i is reached under s ε is P(I i )
Pr {h occurs under s ε } = h∈I i c h ε e h (1 − ε) f h > 0. Then P(I i ) can be written as a polynomial in ε, that is, P(I i ) = b 0 + b 1 ε + b 2 ε 2 + . . . + b r ε r , where the coefficients b 0 , . . . , b r may be zero, positive or negative. Following Bayes' rule, for any history h ∈ I i ,
To define the belief system µ, let d be the minimum degree of ε in P(I i ) such that b d = 0. As the minimum degree of ε in each term c h ε e h (1 − ε) f h is e h with coefficient c h > 0, we have
It is easy to see that µ i (I i ) is a probability distribution over
for any player i, information set I i of i and history h ∈ I i , and µ ε converges to µ as ε → 0. Since s ε converges to s as we have seen, s and µ are consistent.
For sequential rationality, the only thing we need to show is that, at a reachable information set, the belief specified by µ is derived from s using Bayes' rule. To do so, consider an arbitrary player i and an information set I i of i that is reachable by s. By definition, there exists h ∈ I i such that e h = 0, thus d = 0 for P(I i ) and b 0 = h∈I i ,e h =0 c h . Therefore µ i (I i ) is indeed the probability distribution derived from s using Bayes' rule. Sequential rationality of s (with respect to µ) then follows from the definition of SSE. Thus (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Alternative Definition of Strong Sequential Equilibrium. The notion of strong sequential equilibrium, as stated in Definition 6, requires that at any unreachable information set, regardless of the belief the acting player holds at that set, his action should be a best response to that belief and the other players' strategies. We now give an equivalent definition of strong sequential equilibrium, which says that a player's strategy at an unreachable information set should be optimal following every history in that information set. This definition is more convenient when proving that a strategy profile is an SSE. Definition 26. A strategy profile s is a strong sequential equilibrium if for every player i and information set I i of i, we have:
• At reachable information sets I: conditional on I i being reached, player i's strategy s i is a best response to s −i , given i's beliefs at I i being derived from s using Bayes' rule.
• At unreachable information sets I i : for every history h ∈ I i , conditional on I i being reached, player i's strategy s i is a best response to s −i , given i's belief that he is at h with probability 1.
We now prove the equivalence of the two definitions of SSE in the following lemma. W.l.o.g., s is a profile of pure strategies.
Lemma 27. For any strategy profile s, any player i and information set I i of i that is not reached with positive probability under s, conditional on I i being reached, s i is a best response to s −i with respect to all possible beliefs that player i may hold at I i if and only if for every history h ∈ I i , s i is a best response to s −i given i's belief that he is at h with probability 1.
Proof. The "only if" part is immediate, because for any history h ∈ I i , "at h with probability 1 (and any other history with probability 0)" is a specific belief that i may hold at I i .
The "if" part is also easy to show. Suppose that s i is a best response to s −i conditional on every history h ∈ I i (i.e., at h with probability 1). To show that s i is a best response to s −i conditional on all possible beliefs player i may hold at information set I i , arbitrarily fix a belief µ i (I i ) over I i and a strategy s ′ i . Let
, where µ i (I i )(h k ) is the probability with which player i believes that history h k occurs conditional on I i being reached. Then, player i's expected utilities under s i and s ′ i respectively, conditioned on I i , µ i (I i ) and s −i , are
) and the "if" part holds.
Corollary 28. Definition 6 and Definition 26 of strong sequential equilibrium are equivalent.
One-Shot Deviation for Strong Sequential Equilibrium. Informally, the one-shot deviation principle says that a player cannot change his action at a single information set (without changing the rest of his strategy) and improve his expected reward.
In the context of sequential equilibrium, it is well known that given a consistent belief system µ, (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium if and only if the one-shot deviation principle holds, that is, no player i has an information set I i at which a change in s i (I i )-holding the remainding of s i fixed-increases his expected utility conditional on reaching I i [47, 54] .
Since strong sequential equilibrium does not require artificial notion of beliefs for unreachable information sets, we define a stronger notion of one-shot deviation at those information sets-for every decision node (i.e., history) in an unreachable information set of player i, there does not exist a one-shot deviation at that node which improves player i's utility conditional on that node being reached. Note that at reachable information sets, both the definition and proof of the one-shot deviation condition for SSE are exactly the same as in SE [47] .
Lemma 29 (One-Shot Deviation for Strong Sequential Equilibrium). For any strategy profile s, s is a strong sequential equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following one-shot deviation principle: For every player i and every information set I i of i, • If I i is reachable under s: there does not exist a change in s i (I i ) (holding the rest of s i fixed) that increases player i's expected utility conditional on reaching I i , given his belief at I i derived using Bayes' rule.
• If I i is unreachable under s: for every history h ∈ I i , there does not exist a change in s i (I i ) (holding the rest of s i fixed) that increases player i's expected utility conditional on reaching h.
Proof. The "only if" part follows immediately from Definition 26 and the fact that a one-shot deviation results in a different strategy for the deviating player. We now prove the "if" part, that is, if s satisfies the one-shot deviation principle then it is a strong sequential equilibrium. Reachable information sets. First of all, similar to the proof of Lemma 25, we can construct a belief system µ such that s and µ are consistent. Indeed, the construction of µ only depends on the actions taken by s and does not depend on the utilities induced by s at all. Since s satisfies the oneshot deviation principle at every reachable information set and at every history in each unreachable information set, it is not hard to see that s satisfies the one-shot deviation principle with respect to µ. Thus (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium. Accordingly, for any player i and information set I i of i that is reachable by s, s i is a best response to s −i conditional on µ i (I i ) (which is derived from s using Bayes' rule at I i ), as desired by the definition of SSE.
Unreachable information sets. Next, we use backward induction to show that, for any player i, information set I i of i that is unreachable by s, and history h ∈ I i , s i is a best response to s −i conditional on reaching h. To begin with, if h is of height 1 then this immediately holds: indeed, the strategy induced by s i following h is exactly the action s i (I i ), thus the one-shot deviation principle implies that s i is a best response to s −i at h. Now, arbitrarily fix a player i, information set I i of i unreachable by s, and a history h ∈ I i of height larger than 1. By induction, assume that for any information set I ′ i of i unreachable by s, and history h ′ ∈ I ′ i of height smaller than that of h, s i is a best response to s −i at h ′ . For the sake of contradiction, suppose player i can deviate to strategy s ′ i and increase his utility conditional on reaching h, that is,
, contradicting the inductive hypothesis. Thus we have s
i is the same as s i at all the histories following (h, s ′ i (I i )) where player i acts, then the oneshot deviation principle is violated. Accordingly, there must exist a history following (h, s ′ i (I i )), where player i acts and s ′ i differ from s i . Letting h ′ be the first such history, we have that the height of h ′ is smaller than that of h. Since h ′ is unreachable by s, by the inductive hypothesis we have that s i is a best response to
Let strategy s ′′ i be such that, it follows s i till history h, then follows action s ′ i (I i ), then follows s ′ i (and s i as well, because they are the same after (h, s ′ i (I i )) and before h ′ ) till history h ′ , and then follows s i for the rest. Note that s ′′ i can be obtained from s i by a one-shot deviation from s i (I i ) to s ′ i (I i ). However,
contradicting the one-shot deviation principle. Therefore s i is a best response to s −i conditional on reaching h, as desired. Combining everything together, by Definition 26, s is an SSE and Lemma 29 holds.
Verifying Strong Sequential Equilibrium. Given an extensive-form game with arbitrary number of players, it is possible to decide whether a pair (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium in time polynomial in the size of the game tree [37] . However, if only a strategy profile s is given, then it is NP-hard to decide whether s is part of an SE (that is, whether there exists a belief system µ such that (s, µ) is an SE) [46] . As strong sequential equilibrium does not rely on belief systems, we prove the following.
Lemma 30. Given an extensive-form game and a strategy profile s of the players, deciding whether s is a SSE of the game can be done in time polynomial in the size of the game tree.
Proof. First of all, we can traverse the game tree in polynomial time, mark each information set whether it is reachable by s or not, and compute, for each player i and each reachable information set I i of i, the belief µ i (I i ) derived from s using Bayes' rule. Next, we apply the one-shot deviation principle following Lemma 29.
To do so, we start from the bottom level of the tree and proceed up. For every player i and every information set I i of i, if I i is unreachable under s, then we go through each h ∈ I i and each a ∈ A(I i ), and check if changing s i (I i ) to a improves i's utility conditional on reaching h. If so then s is not an SSE. If I i is reachable under s, then we go through every a ∈ A(I i ), and check if changing s i (I i ) to a improves i's expected utility conditional on I i and µ i (I i ). If so then again s is not an SSE. If all the checks above pass, then s is an SSE.
Since this procedure goes through each decision node of the game tree at most once, and since it takes polynomial time to compute player i's (expected) utility under s following a decision node (or an information set), deciding whether s is an SSE takes polynomial time in the size of the tree.
C Omitted Proofs
In this section, we give full proofs of the lemma statements in Section 3 and Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 11. The ncRIP protocol for any language L ∈ NEXP is given in Figure 2 .
We show that there exists a strategy profile s = (s 1 , s 2 ) of provers P 1 and P 2 respectively that is a recursive-maximum SSE of the game tree corresponding to the protocol (V, P 1 , P 2 ) and under any recursive-maximum SSE, the answer bit c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
In the protocol, if c = 0, no player acts. If c = 1, the verifier executes the 1-round blackbox MIP protocol with P 1 and P 2 . To exhibit a strategy that is a best response for P 1 and P 2 on their information sets at step 3, we look at the messages the verifier sends to each prover in the classic MIP protocol. In the MIP protocol, the verifier sends P 1 a tuple of message pairs m 1 = ((q 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (q m , x m )) where m is a polynomial in n and V sends P 2 a tuple of random messages m 2 = (y 1 , . . . , y m ). P 1 sends back a polynomial P (t) and P 2 sends back the value of the polynomial P (t) for t satisfying q j + tx j = y j . The verifier rejects if their answers are inconsistent.
To analyze the SSE strategy, without loss of generality, suppose P 1 moves last in the MIP protocol. Any information set I 1 of P 1 at step 3 is characterized by the message m 1 he receives. The decision nodes in I 1 correspond to each possible message m 2 that P 2 could have received.
Because the V gives the largest payment when the MIP protocol accepts, given P 2 's strategy, if any information set I 1 of P 1 is reached under s then P 1 's best response at I 1 is to maximize the acceptance-probability of the MIP protocol given his beliefs on I 1 . Similarly, given P 2 's strategy, if any information set I 1 of P 1 is unreachable under s then, P 1 's best response at I 1 for every decision node in I 1 is the following: given m 1 = ((q 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , (q m , x m )), respond with a polynomial P (t) such that P (t)'s value at all t coincides with P 2 's reply on all y j where q j + tx j = y j .
Given P 1 's strategy of committing to a polynomial P (t) that matches P 2 on all values of t, P 2 ' best response at any information set I 2 (reachable or unreachable under s) at step 3 at every decision node in I 2 is to answer the tuple of queries (y 1 , . . . , y m ) so as to maximize the acceptance probability of the MIP protocol. The verifier's move at step 3 is the root of a non-trivial subgame. Conditioned on step 3 being reached, any maximum SSE at this subgame corresponds to a strategy profile s that is an SSE, which when restricted to this subgame, maximizes the acceptance probaility of the MIP protocol. Under any such recursive-maximum SSE, we show that P 1 's best response at step 1 is to send the correct answer bit.
Suppose x ∈ L. If P 1 sends c = 0, then R 1 = 1/2 with probability 1. On the other hand, if P 1 sends c = 1, by the soundness condition of the MIP protocol, the acceptance probability is 1, leading to R 1 = 1. Thus for x ∈ L, s is a recursive-maximum SSE iff P 1 sends c = 1. Suppose x / ∈ L. If P 1 reports c = 0, then R 1 = 1/2 with probability 1. On the other hand if P 1 reports c = 1, then by the soundness condition of the MIP protocol, the maximum acceptance probability is 1/3 leading to R 1 = 1. The protocol rejects with probability at least 2/3 leading to R 1 = −1. Thus, P 1 's expected payment for misreporting the answer bit is at most R 1 = −1/3. Thus for x / ∈ L, s is a recursive-maximum SSE iff P 1 sends c = 0. Thus, under s which is a recursive-maximum SSE, c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L. Furthermore, the payment incurred by the provers when the answer bit sent in the first round is incorrect is at least 5/6 for both provers and thus the protocol has constant utility gap.
Proof of Lemma 12. Consider any language L ∈ P NEXP[α(n)] . Let M be a polynomial-time Turing machine deciding L, with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language.
The ncRIP protocol for L is given in Figure 3 . Let s 1 , s 2 , s 3 denote the strategy used by P 1 , P 2 and P 3 for the protocol in Figure 3 , and s = (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 ). First, note that regardless of s 2 and s 3 , P 1 's best response at step 1 is to send the bits c, c 1 , . . . , c α (n) such that the verification in step 2 goes through. In particular, if s 1 is such that the output of M on input x, using c 1 , . . . , c α(n) as answers to NEXP queries φ 1 , . . . , φ α(n) is consistent with c, then P 1 gets R 1 ≥ 0. Meanwhile, if the verification in step 2 fails then R = −1. Thus, under any SSE s, the answer bits c 1 , . . . , c α(n) sent by P 1 must be consistent with the computation of M on x and the final the answer bit c, regardless of s 2 and s 3 .
We now argue using backward induction. Each random index i ′ chosen by V in step 3 together with φ i ′ starts a forest subgame. In particular, since P 2 and P 3 both know (i ′ , φ i ′ ), all their information sets starting from step 4 are completely disjoint from information sets reached under a different index and NEXP query. By Lemma 11, there exists a recursive-maximum SSE s on each such forest subgame simulating an NEXP query, and under any recursive-maximum SSE, s 2 and s 3 are such that c * i ′ is the correct answer to the NEXP query. Moving up the tree, the next forest-subgame is induced by V 's nature move at step 3 assigning a probability to each subsequent forest subgame. Since under any recursive-maximum SSE, the expected payments of P 2 and P 3 (conditioned on reaching these forest subgames) are maximized, the overall expected payments under V 's nature move at step 3 is also maximized. We move up a further level in the tree to the root. We show that P 1 's best response at step 1 is to send the correct answer bits, given that under any recursive-maximum SSE s:
• P 2 and P 3 answer each NEXP query φ i ′ determined by s 1 and index i ′ correctly, and • the verification in step 2 goes through (i.e. P does not set R 1 = −1) under s 1 . Suppose s 1 is such that there exists an NEXP query where P 1 lies. Let k be the first NEXP query index such that c k is not the correct answer to query φ k , where 1 ≤ k ≤ α(n). In particular, the instance φ k is evaluated correctly (by running M on x using the correct answers to previous queries: c 1 , . . . , c k−1 but the answer c k is not evaluated correctly based on φ k . Then with probability 1/α(n), V picks k in step 3 and crosschecks the c k with c * i ′ , in which case the verification fails and R 1 = 0. Thus, P 1 's expected payment is at most 1 − 1/α(n). If P 1 answers all NEXP queries correctly, since the verification in step 2 goes through, P 1 gets R 1 = 1 with probability 1. Thus, c, c 1 , . . . , c α(n) are correct under any recursive-maximum SSE s, and c = 0 if and only if x ∈ L. Now, we show that protocol (V, P ) has O(α(n)) utility gap. Let s * be a recursive-maximum SSE of the game resulting from (V, P ). Suppose s ′ is such that the answer bit c ′ under s ′ is incorrect. We go "bottom-up" in the game tree and exhibit a forest subgame H I (reachable under s ′ ) such that some prover acting in that subgame loses O(1/α(n)) compared to the strategy where s * I is played on H I , keeping the rest of the strategy fixed.
First, consider all the NEXP queries at step 4 that start forest subgames. Suppose there exists a query φ k committed under s ′ 1 , for 1 ≤ k ≤ α(n), such that c k * is the wrong answer to φ k . By Lemma 11, both P 2 and P 3 lose a constant amount (5/6 in particular) from their expected payment (conditioned on reaching this subgame) compared to the recursive-maximum SSE strategy profile s * φ k which reports the correct answer to φ k . Since V chooses φ k with probability 1/α(n), P 2 and P 3 can gain O(1/α(n)) in their overall expected payment by deviating to strategy profile s φ k , at the forest subgame corresponding to (k, φ k ) keeping s ′ −φ k fixed. Specifically,
, for i ∈ {2, 3}.
Finally, suppose P 2 and P 3 answer all NEXP queries (reachable under s ′ ) correctly. Then, P 1 loses at least 1/α(n) at the forest subgame at the root-the entire game. Since the answer bit c ′ under s ′ is incorrect, either step 2 fails or P 1 lies on some NEXP query. In the first case, P 1 gets −1 with probability 1 compared to an expected payment of 1 under s * . In the second case, P 1 gets caught in step 4 with probability 1/α(n), and gets an expected payment of at most 1 − 1/α(n), losing at least 1/α(n) compared to s * .
Thus, the protocol (V, P ) is an ncRIP protocol for P NEXP[O(α(n)]) and has O(α(n)) utility gap.
Proof of Lemma 31. Let (V, P ) be an MRIP protocol with p(n) provers and k(n) rounds for a language L. Without loss of generality, each message in the protocol is of length ℓ(n) for any input of length n, where ℓ(n) is a polynomial in n. We shift and rescale the payment function of V , so that the payment is always in [0, 1], and the expected payment is strictly greater than 0 under the provers' best strategy profile. We simulate (V, P ′ ) using an ncRIP protocol (V ′ , (P ′ 1 , P ′ 2 )), given in Figure 4 .
Lemma 31. Any MRIP protocol can be simulated using a 2-prover 3-round ncRIP protocol with O(1/2 n k )-utility gap, for some constant k, where n is the length of the input.
Given an input x of length n, and an MRIP protocol (V, P ), the ncRIP protocol (V ′ , P ′ ) is: 1. P ′ 1 sends the round 1 messages m 11 , . . . , m p(n)1 of (V, P ) to V ′ . V ′ outputs c, the first bit of m 11 , at the end of the protocol. 2. V ′ selects a random prover index i ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)} and a random round j ∈ {1, . . . , k(n)}.
Then, V ′ generates a random stringm ij of length (j − 1)ℓ(n). 3. V ′ sends (i, j,m ij ) to P ′ 2 . P ′ 2 simulates P i on round j, and sends the message m ′ ij to V ′ . 4. V ′ generates all the randomness r used by V and sends it to P ′ 1 . 5. P ′ 1 uses r to simulate the protocol (V, P ), and sends the resulting transcript m to V ′ . 6. Ifm ij = (m i1 , . . . , m i(j−1) ), where m ij denotes prover P i 's message in round j according to m sent by P 1 ', then the protocol ends and
Else, V ′ computes the payment R in (V, P ) using x, r and m, and sets R ′ 1 = 0, R ′ 2 = R. Let s ′ 1 and s ′ 2 denote the strategy of the provers P ′ 1 and P ′ 2 respectively and s ′ = (s ′ 1 , s ′ 2 ). Since P ′ 2 is queried only once and about a single message in Step 3, any strategy s ′ 2 of P ′ 2 de facto commits to a strategy profile for the provers in (V, P ).
We analyze the game tree of the protocol (V ′ , P ′ ) bottom-up. The last move is by P ′ 1 sending the entire transcript m at step 5. Any information set I ′ 1 of P ′ 1 is characterized by the randomness r received by P ′ 1 in step 4 and all information sets are reachable under any s ′ . The decision nodes in I ′ 2 correspond to different stringsm ij that P ′ 2 could have been asked in step 2. Given s ′ 2 , the best response of P ′ 1 at any information set I ′ 1 , for any beliefs at I ′ 1 , is to match the transcript committed by P ′ 2 and make the verification in step 7 go through. Suppose there exists a prover index i and round j such that the message m ij in m that is inconsistent with the corresponding message m ′ ij committed under s ′ 2 . With probability 1 2 (j−1)ℓ(n) , the random stringm ij generated by V ′ in Step 2 is equal to (m i1 , . . . , m i(j−1) ), otherwise the protocol ends with R ′ 1 = 0. With probability at least 1 p(n)k(n) , V ′ chooses (i, j) in step 2, and queries P ′ 2 for m ′ ij and
On the other hand, matching s ′ 2 on all messages leads to an expected payment of 0 at I ′ 1 for P ′ 1 . Given that P ′ 1 best response is to make the verifier in step 7 go through for every randomness r, we analyze P ′ 2 move at step 3. Any information set I ′ 2 of P ′ 2 is characterized by the random string m ij received by P ′ 2 in step 2 and all information sets are reachable under any s ′ . The decision nodes in I ′ 1 correspond to different random strings r that P ′ 1 could have been asked in step 2. The best response of P ′ 2 at any information set I ′ 1 , for any beliefs at I ′ 1 , is to commit to the correct strategy profile s of the provers P . Suppose P ′ 2 commits to a strategy profile s ′ such that the answer bit under s ′ is wrong. With probability 1 2 (j−1)ℓ(n) , the random stringm ij generated by V ′ in Step 2 matches (m i1 , . . . , m i(j−1) ), otherwise the protocol ends with R ′ 2 = 0. If it matches, then P ′ 2 expected payment is determined by the expected payment thats gets in (V, P ) given x and randomness r, which is strictly less than the expected payment under the strategy profile s which commits to the correct answer bit (by correctness of the original MRIP protocol). That is,
Thus, given that s ′ 1 matches s ′ 2 for every randomness r, the best response by P ′ 2 is to commit to a strategy profile s ′ 2 = s that maximizes the total expected payment of the original protocol (V, P ) and thus has the correct answer bit.
There are no non-trivial subgame in the game. Any maximum SSE is a recursive-maximum SSE, under which both P ′ 1 and P ′ 2 maximize their expected payments-P ′ 1 matches P ′ 2 on all messages and P ′ 2 commits to the correct strategy profile s. Thus, the protocol (V, P ) is correct.
Proof of Lemma 20. Given any L ∈ α(n)-ncRIP, let (V, P ) be the MRIP protocol with α(n) utility gap for L, where α(n) is a constant. Given an input x of lenth n, consider the following deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing machine M with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language. Similar to the proof of Lemma 22, M divides [−1, 1] into 8α(n) intervals, each of length 1/4α(n). In other words, the ith interval is [i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)) for each i ∈ {−4α(n), . . . , 4α(n) − 1}. 8 Using Lemma 14, under a given input x and strategy profile s, there are at most 8α(n) forest subgames are reached under any s in the modified game. Total expected payment of provers acting within any forest subgame (conditioned on reaching the forest subgame must) lie in any one of the 8α(n) intervals in [−1, 1]. Thus overall, there are O(α(n) α (n)) combinations of total expected payments over forest subgames, which is still O(1). Let (u, u I 1 , . . . , u I k ) be a tuple of total expected payments, where k = 8α(n), the maximum number of forest subgames reachable under any s, and u represents the total expected payment of the whole game, whereas u I j represents total expected payment of the provers acting in forest subgame I j (conditioned on reaching I j ).
For each combination (u, u I 1 , . . . , u I k ), M queries O: does there exists a strategy profile that is an SSE and the total expected payments over reachable forest subgames under s and O(α(n)) support Nature moves imposed by Lemma 14 is (u, u I 1 , . . . , u I k ) (conditioned on reaching the forest subgames)? Among the queries to which the oracle's answer is "yes", M finds the combination that achieves maximum expected payment for all forest subgames. Such a combination is guaranteed to exist because (V, P ) is an ncRIP protocol, and a recursive-maximum SSE of the game exists and maximizes expected payment on all subgames.
Proof of Lemma 22. Given any L ∈ poly(n)-ncRIP, let (V, P ) be the MRIP protocol with α(n) utility gap for L, where α(n) = n k for some constant k.
Given an input x of lenth n, consider the following deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing machine M with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language. M divides [−1, 1] into 8α(n) intervals, each of length 1/4α(n). In other words, the ith interval is [i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)) for each i ∈ {−4α(n), . . . , 4α(n) − 1}. 9 For each interval [i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)), M makes the following queries to O: does there exist a strategy profile s that is an SSE and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s) is in the ith interval? Let L denote the set of intervals for which the answer to the query is "yes".
For each interval [ℓ/4α(n), (ℓ + 1)/4α(n)) ∈ L, M queries O: does there exist a strategy profile s that is an SSE and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s) is in the first half of the ℓth interval? If the answer is "yes", then M recurses on the first half, else M recursives on the second half of the interval. In polynomial time and polynomial queries, M can find the exact total expected payment u(x, s, (V, P )) in the interval that is generated by an SSE. M asks further queries to figure out the exact payment profile under such an SSE. For k ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)}, where p(n) is the total number of provers in (V, P ), and for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n k ′ }, where n k ′ is the running time of V (k ′ is a constant), M asks the following queries adaptivily: under an SSE where
what is the jth bit in the expected payment µ k (x, s) of prover P k , given and the first j − 1 bits of µ k (x, s) and µ 1 (x, s), . . . , µ k−1 (x, s). In O(n k ′ p(n)) queries, M can figure out the exact payment profileũ(x, s) = (µ 1 , (x, s) . . . , µ k (x, s)) under an SSE s, such that the total expected payment is in the ℓth interval.
M now verifies whether the SSE corresponding to the payment profileũ(x, s) satisfies the condition of Observation 13. M proceeds in two phases: first, M wants to go "top-down" figuring out what part of the game tree is being played under s on input x, using the oracle to simulate the provers and the verifier. Then, it goes "bottom-up" in the tree being played under s, to check whether all forest subgames are "(1/α(n))-close" to the recursive-maximum at that forest subgame.
Top-down phase. Let k(n) be the total number of rounds in (V, P ). Note that k(n) is polynomial in n. Let m ij denote the message sent by prover P i at round j. Then, for each round j and each prover i where 1 ≤ j ≤ k(n) and 1 ≤ k ≤ p(n), M first asks the oracle to give the "pruned" O(α(n)) support distribution imposed by the Nature move of V at round j bit by bit as follows: "under an SSE where the expected payment profile isũ(x, s), what is the rth bit of the distribution imposed by V ′ using V and Lemma 14?" This requires a polynomial number of bits (and therefore queries) because the distribution is polynomial sized. The pruned distribution preserves the recursivemaximum SSE and changes the utility gap by only a factor 2 (this factor does not affect the proof as our intervals are scaled down to handle it). Given this distribution, M simulates V on the support of the distribution to figure out the messages that V sends to the provers in round j. In particular, M does not have access to random bits, so instead it simulates every action of V in the support. To simulate the provers at round j, M similarly queries O bit by bit: "under an SSE where the expected payment profile isũ(x, s), what is the rth bit of the message sent by P k ". Thus, after simulating the moves of V and P under s, M has sketched out the O(α(n)) size part of the game tree being played under s corresponding toũ(x, s).
Bottom-up phase. Given the O(α(n)) nodes of the game tree under play, M can mark out the forest subgames reachable under s (correspondingtoũ(x, s). Going from last level up, for each forest subgame H I reachable under s, M uses the oracle to figure out which payment interval the expected payments of the maximum SSE on H I lie in (given the expected maximum SSE payments on the reachable forest subgames verified so far), until it finds a subgame that violates the condition of Observation 13.
In particular, for each forest subgame H I of height k, letũ(x, s, I ′ ) denote the tuple of total expected payments under s on all forest subgames H I ′ of height < k following I (conditioned on reaching I) verified so far. M divides the interval [−1, 1] into 8α(n) intervals of size α(n)/4 as before and for each interval queries the oracle O: does there exist a strategy profile s I on subagme H I that is an SSE and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s, I) is in the xth interval, and gets a total expected payments on forest subgames H I ′ of height < k following I equal toũ(x, s, I ′ ). 10 Then, M finds the maximum interval [i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)) among the intervals for which the oracle says yes. By Lemma 19, the maximum SEE s max I at H I also lies in the ith interval. Using the probability p I assigned by H I (M knows the distribution imposed by all "pruned" Nature moves), M checks whether the total expected payment of maximum SSE s max I is in the same interval as the sum of expected payments of provers in Z I under s. If it is not, then s fails the test and M continues to the next interval in L. Otherwise, M continues to the next reachable forest subgame.
If s passes the test for all forest subgames (including at the root), then by Observation 13, the answer bit under s is correct. M 's final query to O is: "under an SSE where the expected payment profile isũ(x, s), what is the answer bit c? If c = 1, then M accepts x, otherwise M rejects x.
M is guaranteed to find a payment profileũ(x, s) (and thus a strategy profile s) that passes the test. Since (V, P ) is an ncRIP protocol for L, there exists a recusive-maximum SSE s * in some interval in L. By Obversation 13, if a strategy profile s ′ fails the test, the recursive-maximum SSE can not get a total expected payment in the same interval as s ′ . Thus, we can rule out intervals by checking any SSE with total expected payment in that interval. Since a recursive-maximum SSE s * exists, M must eventually find an interval, where the corresponding SSE passes the test.
To complete the proof, we note that (a) M runs in polynomial time, (b) each query to the oracle is polynomial, and, (c) the oracle queries can be answered in non-deterministic exponential time.
First, (a) holds because each top-down and bottom-up phase is executed O(α(n)) times and each of the phases take polynomial time. In the top-down phase, M simulates the protocol on strategy s using the oracle while restricting the verifier's Nature moves to be of O(α(n)) support. Thus this phase takes polynomial time. For the bottom-up phase, M finds maximum SSEs at each reachable subgames under s. Since there are at most O(α(n)) forest subgames and at most O(α(n)) interval queries for each forest subgame, the bottom-up phase takes time polynomial in n.
Second, (b) holds each oracle query involves a total expected paymentũ(x, s) or an interval of size α(n)/2, both of which can be generated by V and hence are polynomial in n.
To prove (c), it is sufficient to show that an NEXP machine can guess a strategy profile and verify if it is an SSE and if it gets expected payments in a certain interval. Since the transcript of any ncRIP protocol is polynomial in n, a strategy profile s of the provers can be represented in exponential bits, and thus O can guess such an s. Now given s and the protocol (V, P ), by Lemma 30,  it is possible to verify whether s is an SSE of the game in time linear in the size of the game tree, and thus exponential in n Furthermore, it can compute the expected payments of the provers under s in exponential time as well, which is sufficient to answer all the queries made by M .
